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Judgements in the real-world often inher-
ently involve uncertainty, from the mun-
dane: “do those clouds signal rain?” to the
potentially life-changing: “Does this per-
son have cancer?” Normatively estimating
the likelihood of outcomes in such situ-
ations involves considering how compet-
ing sources of probabilistic evidence (“how
likely are clouds with/without rain?”)
should be weighed against prior probabil-
ities (“how likely is it to rain/not rain?”),
known as Bayesian reasoning. This com-
plex form of reasoning, however, typi-
cally eludes many people, and can have
dramatic implications including overdiag-
nosis (e.g., Casscells et al., 1978), and
wrongful conviction (e.g., the famous
Sally Clark case in the UK. See Nobles
and Schiff, 2007). Whilst the question
of how best to assist people to make
such judgments remains in critical need
of research (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2014),
this paper considers how extant research
on Bayesian facilitation has been some-
what constrained by both theoretical, and
methodological status-quos. As Mandel
(2014) notes, in more general terms we
still know relatively little about “what it
is to ‘be Bayesian’,” which has clear impli-
cations for our understanding of “what
works and why” in Bayesian intervention.
This paper contemplates several sugges-
tions as to how research may improve
its pursuit of this goal, including the
deconstructing of Bayesian reasoning into
component tasks, and the leveraging of
more process-orientedmeasures to further
integrate burgeoning findings concerning
individual cognitive differences.
Although research has discovered
several interventions that can facilitate
more accurate Bayesian judgments, dis-
cussion has centered on a distinct division
as to the psychological basis of these
facilitation effects. Facilitation is often
explained as being due to either (a)
humans having evolved a cognitive pri-
macy specifically for naturally sampled
data (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995;
Brase, 2009), or alternatively (b) an acti-
vation of more general analytical cognitive
processes through explicating nested sub-
set relations (e.g., Sloman et al., 2003;
Yamagishi, 2003). Whilst the former, evo-
lutionary hypothesis advocates facilitation
through expressing data as natural fre-
quencies, the latter, nested-sets hypothesis
argues that reasoning can be improved
irrespective of numerical format by gener-
ally clarifying set relations in the structure
of the available evidence, such as through
the use of visual diagrams. The debate
between both positions, to a large extent,
continues to define the literature on
Bayesian reasoning (more recently Brase,
2008; Hill and Brase, 2012; Lesage et al.,
2013; Sirota et al., 2014). But, whilst there
continues to be disagreement on how best
to facilitate Bayesian reasoning, one might
look to the research and note the distinct
variability in reported improvements pro-
duced by both frequency- and set-based
interventions.
To illustrate, uncertain data expressed
as naturally-sampled frequencies can
increase Bayesian accuracy as high as either
76% (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996), 54%
(Evans et al., 2000), or 31% (Sloman et al.,
2003) where equivalent measures have
been used. Similarly, equivalent visual
diagrams that elucidate nested set rela-
tions, irrespective of numerical format,
can improve accuracy rates as high as
80% (Yamagishi, 2003), 48% (Sloman
et al., 2003), or 35% (Brase, 2009). Such
variability exposes a particular limita-
tion common to both perspectives in
that neither theory offers satisfactory
explanations as to why many people are
seemingly not facilitated by their respec-
tive interventions. This perhaps stems
more generally from the fact that both
perspectives provide little specification of
the actual mental journey people undergo
when attempting to reason in Bayesian
terms. By more clearly characterizing what
distinguishes those who are and those
who are not facilitated we might over-
come some of these theoretical limitations
and, ultimately, further extend our under-
standing of how best to improve Bayesian
reasoning beyond the theoretical divide
that currently exists.
Approaching this issue involves a slight
shift in perspective from “what works and
why?” in Bayesian facilitation to “what
works for whom, and why?” (see Hill
and Brase, 2012; McNair and Feeney,
in press, for examples), and more recent
research has begun to illuminate a diverse
range of psychological capacities associ-
ated with Bayesian facilitation. Abilities
such as numeracy (e.g., Johnson and
Tubau, 2013; McNair and Feeney, in press;
though see also Hill and Brase, 2012); cog-
nitive reflection (Lesage et al., 2013); and
fluid intelligence (e.g., Sirota et al., 2014)
have variously being associated with good
Bayesian reasoning, which may go some
way in explaining why previous research
has noted such variability in facilitation
findings (see Brase et al., 2006, for related
concerns). Yet, identifying that component
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abilities and traits are associated with facil-
itation effects answers only part of the
above question. Moreover, recent discus-
sion of individual differences in Bayesian
facilitation has remained grounded in the
evolutionary and nested-sets debate as it
stands, and as such there exists limited
extrapolation of these findings beyond the
abstract activation of either a frequency-
processing engine in the brain, or set-
based analytical processing [though see
discussions of Sirota et al. (2014) and
Johnson and Tubau (2013) for some fur-
ther speculation]. Of further interest is
exactly how these individual differences in
facilitation are manifest in terms of differ-
ential thought processes that separate good
Bayesian reasoning from bad.
Other recent research, for instance, is
beginning to unearth exactly how different
cognitive abilities inform different forms
of reasoning (e.g., Del Missier et al., 2013).
Elsewhere, De Neys and Bonnefon (2013)
consider that cognitive individual differ-
ences may occur either early or late in the
reasoning process. Their contention is that
early individual divergences in the reason-
ing process may represent a more funda-
mental lack of formal knowledge, whilst
later divergences may represent failures in
appropriately applying knowledge. Given
this hypothesis, individual differences in
facilitation effects could be leveraged to
signal the particular step in the Bayesian
process on which a particular interven-
tion exerts most benefit. For this type of
approach to yield maximum insight, how-
ever, requires more than a slight shift in
theoretical perspective; it will also require
a reappraisal of some typical methodolog-
ical practices used in the study of Bayesian
reasoning.
Mandel (2014) succinctly notes sev-
eral issues that have typified the archety-
pal methods used to study Bayesian
reasoning, notably that of using word
problems such as Eddy’s (1982) mammog-
raphy problem. Whilst the use of word
problems can provide a convenient lit-
mus test of one’s capacity for Bayesian
thought, they are often studied in ways
that afford limited insight into reason-
ers’ thinking. Two longstanding issues
in particular can be identified that, if
addressed, would complement attempts
to understand how reasoners conduct
the process of Bayesian reasoning, and
how component abilities map onto this
process.
Firstly, word problems predominantly
focus on the endpoint of the judgment
process, that is: whether someone pro-
duces the correct numerical estimate or
not. We might conceive of the process
of Bayesian judgment as akin to navigat-
ing a maze: there is usually one correct
path to the exit, but several dead ends
that one may arrive at before identifying
the correct path. The process of Bayesian
reasoning, for most people, may involve
a similar process of cognitive tribulation
before one reaches the point of arith-
metic computation. Yet, by focusing on the
endpoint we learn little about the jour-
ney. In doing so, research eschews poten-
tial opportunities to gain richer awareness
into how interventions may change peo-
ples’ mental journey through the Bayesian
maze, awareness that would further clar-
ify the manner in which these interven-
tions are effective. Future research, then,
should look to study how reasoners reach
their final Bayesian judgments, rather than
simply what that final judgment is. One
suggestion would be to make greater use of
think-aloud protocols to identify the steps
at which non-Bayesian deviations occur,
and what such deviations entail. Whilst
think-aloud paradigms are not without
issue—verbalizing thoughts when reason-
ing can be cognitively challenging (Wilson,
1994); and the mere act of thinking aloud
can reactively alter the reasoning pro-
cess (e.g., Ericsson and Simon, 1998)—the
process has previously yielded useful infer-
ences into the types of thoughts underly-
ing errors in Bayesian reasoning (De Neys
and Glumicic, 2008). Potential procedu-
ral issues are also not without remedy.
Although asking reasoners to think-aloud
whilst solving more complex Bayesian
word problems may prove overly-taxing
for the average person, an alternative
approach might see the Bayesian task bro-
ken down into component steps such as,
for instance, information selection; infor-
mation integration; and finally calculation
(see Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007, for a
similar conceptualization). Reducing the
overall task into component subtasks pre-
sented sequentially may reduce the over-
all burden of a think-aloud paradigm in
this context, and more importantly max-
imize insight into the exact points in
the Bayesian maze at which people devi-
ate from the normative path, permitting
more fine-grained interpretations. Varying
the think-aloud procedure between sub-
jects should also control for any concern
regarding whether a think-aloud approach
might actually alter how people would
otherwise think about and reason through
the task.
A second longstanding issue concerns
how research often denotes participant
estimates as “correct” (i.e., Bayesian) or
“incorrect” (i.e., all other responses).
Focusing on the accuracy of judgments
alonemay conceivablymean an indetermi-
nate number of respondents are perhaps
harshly categorized as poor Bayesian rea-
soners on account of failing to compute
a strictly normatively accurate estimate.
McNair and Feeney (2013), for instance,
observed negligible levels of Bayesian
responding on a mammography problem
when only exactly arithmetically correct
responses were accepted, yet consistently
observed that a quarter of all responses
fell within 5% of the correct estimate.
Furthermore, the specific errors people
produce offer potentially rich insights as
to how the final judgment was conceived
(e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995); an
overly conservative judgment connotes a
very different thought process to a wildly
inflated estimate. Future research may
look to leverage Zhu and Gigerenzer’s
(2006) “write-aloud” procedure, as an
example, which not only identifies a
range of discrete errors—each charac-
terized by different reasoning—but also
precludes those who produce marginally
incorrect estimates as being classified as
de facto poor reasoners. Furthermore,
rather than dichotomizing responses—
which may give a diminished sense of
an intervention’s effectiveness—reporting
graded improvements in accuracy (e.g.,
number of judgments within 5, 10, or 15%
of the arithmetic estimate etc.) may also
provide an altogether more rigorous eval-
uation of an intervention’s capacity for
facilitation.
Research on Bayesian facilitation con-
tinues to be productive, as evidenced by
the recent upturn in research on indi-
vidual differences in facilitation effects.
Facilitating Bayesian reasoning, ultimately,
requires an understanding of the “cog-
nitive tools” people need in order to
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 97 | 2
McNair Status quos in Bayesian reasoning research
make such judgments (Ayal and Beyth-
Marom, 2014), and how these are applied
when engaging in the mental process
of Bayesian reasoning. What do people
do when navigating the Bayesian maze?
At what “step” in the process do devi-
ations from the normative path occur,
and are such errors predicted by partic-
ular cognitive limitations? The develop-
ing picture regarding cognitive capacities
and Bayesian reasoning represents an ideal
opportunity to more-closely address such
questions, but in doing so research must
do more to resist certain tendencies that
have become somewhat ingrained into the
study of Bayesian reasoning. Overcoming
these status-quos stands to further ele-
vate our understanding of “what works
and why” in Bayesian facilitation through
providing greater specifications of the cog-
nitive minutiae involved in producing
Bayesian judgments than is currently pro-
vided by existing theoretical accounts.
Future research should perhaps look to
investigate how specific cognitive capaci-
ties relate to each component “step” in the
Bayesian reasoning process, taking care to
also specify the types of errors produced at
each stage, and doing more to distinguish
good reasoning and bad arithmetic. The
use of more process-oriented methods,
such as those considered earlier, can afford
a much greater level of fidelity in achieving
these goals, and will offer greater insight
into what it means to “be Bayesian”—
how reasoning progresses; and how, when,
and why it sometimes falters. It follows
that such research will allow for more tar-
geted refinements in our understanding of
what types of intervention strategies may
apply best in facilitating better judgments
in domains such as health, law, policy, and
finance.
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